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1. INTRODUCTION
In his 1962 paper “Freedom and Resentment," Peter Strawson attempts to reconcile
incompatibilism and compatibilism about moral responsibility and determinism. First, I present
the error committed by the proponents of both these traditional views, which Strawson diagnoses
as the source of their standoff, and the remedy Strawson offers to avoid the conflict. Second, I
reconstruct the two arguments Strawson offers for a theory of moral responsibility that is based
on his proposed remedy. Third, I present and respond to two proposed problems for the
Strawsonian theory: moral luck and revisionism. I conclude with a summary of my defense of
Strawsonian “expressivism” about moral responsibility, and offer suggestions for further
research.
It is worth noting upfront that my reconstruction of Strawson’s arguments offers an
interpretation of his view that is outside of the mainstream. The mainstream interpretation holds
that Strawson is a meta-ethical expressivist about moral responsibility judgments in the
traditional non-cognitivist sense (see Watson (1987) and Vargas (2005, p. 406)). A noncognitivist about some set of judgments holds that such judgments have no truth value. In this
sense, expressivism holds that moral judgments are nothing more than the expression of the
preferences of the judging agent. Strawson does argue that intuitive responses to another
person’s good or ill will – what he calls “reactive attitudes” or “moral emotions” – are the basis
for his outline of a theory of moral responsibility. Yet, in section 3.1, I interpret Strawson instead
as a cognitivist about moral responsibility judgments – one who thinks that such judgments are
either true or false. Interpreted as a cognitivist expressivist, I attempt to show that a Strawsonian
is much better equipped to respond to the objections from luck and revision.
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2. STRAWSONIAN “EXPRESSIVISM” ABOUT MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
Strawson’s aim in formulating his theory of moral responsibility is to dissolve a dispute
between two opposing positions regarding the problem of free will and determinism. The first
position, incompatibilism, holds that the truth of determinism would universally undermine free
will, and for this reason Strawson calls it the pessimistic view. The second position,
compatibilism, holds that the truth of determinism would not undermine free will, and Strawson
correspondingly refers to it as the optimistic view. The practical import of this debate lies in the
justification of everyday punitive or approbative practices, such as praise and blame or reward
and punishment.1 Both pessimists and optimists accept that free will is required for the
justification of these practices. As a consequence, a pessimist should think that if determinism is
true, these practices ought to be abandoned, while an optimist should think there remains the
possibility for an acceptable justification of these practices even if determinism is true. Strawson
attempts to refocus this debate away from free will and towards moral responsibility, and
specifically the attitudes and practices involved in holding responsible. After diagnosing the
source of the traditional dispute, arguing that it results from both parties adopting an “objective
stance” that ignores everyday attitudes and practices, Strawson suggests that we adopt the
“participant stance,” which proceeds first by description and analysis of the attitudes and
practices involved in holding each other responsible. By adopting this stance, Strawson argues
that we can avoid the traditional stalemate.

1

In this paper I do not address the issue of state institutionalized reward and punishment, and there is no indication
that Strawson is concerned with such practices either. I am concerned with punitive and approbative practices
among individuals, such as thanks and reproach or social inclusion and ostracization. A theory of state and other
forms of institutionalized punitive and approbative practice requires considerations that do not arise for a theory of
responsibility among individuals. For example, it is important to consider the coercive power of the state, the fact
that it extracts taxes from the very people on whom it exerts punishment, and the fact that institutions generally do
not interact in the interpersonal human manner that will become important for Strawson’s theory.
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2.1

The Objective Stance
Strawson exposes the “objective stance” as the source of error that results in the standoff

between the traditional views pertaining to the relation between free will and determinism.2 For
the most part, both sides in this debate are prepared to accept that human beings are, at least
sometimes, free and morally responsible agents. On the one hand, pessimists will have to argue
that determinism is false, so that the necessary condition for moral responsibility is fulfilled. On
the other hand, optimists will usually argue that fulfillment of some other condition is sufficient
for moral responsibility. For the optimists to whom Strawson addresses his argument, the
efficacy of punitive and approbative practices in regulating social behavior is sufficient
justification for holding others morally responsible even if determinism is true. I will call these
optimists classical optimists to distinguish their view from the brand of optimism developed by
Strawson. Following Watson (1987), I will refer to the Strawsonian position as expressivism.
It is significant that the debate between pessimists and classical optimists revolves around
the metaphysical thesis of determinism. Strawson explains that this is the consequence of an
error committed by both parties. The pessimist worries that no one would ever really deserve
praise or blame if determinism is true, and appeals too quickly to the “panicky metaphysics”
(1962, p. 203) of agent causation to alleviate this worry – insisting that agents can somehow
break into otherwise deterministic causal chains. The classical optimist answers this worry by
dismissing the pessimist’s sense of desert and justifying responsibility attribution by appealing to
the calculated efficacy of our practices in regulating social behavior. For Strawson, both parties,
while accepting among the “facts as we know them” that people are capable of morally
2

Nothing in Strawson’s paper turns on having a precise conception of determinism, though it is important that
however it is understood, it is, for incompatibilists, a thesis that would universally rule out free will. In fact, he
specifically tries to show that his reconciliation should work without even knowing what the thesis of determinism
means (p. 191).
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responsible agency, go beyond the facts in an attempt to justify our punitive and approbative
practices by appeal to objective criteria that are external to the practices themselves. Thus,
Strawson diagnoses these disputants with “over-intellectualizing” the facts as follows:
The optimist's style of over-intellectualizing the facts is that of a characteristically
incomplete empiricism, a one-eyed utilitarianism. He seeks to find an adequate basis for
certain social practices in calculated consequences, and loses sight (perhaps wishes to
lose sight) of the human attitudes of which these practices are, in part, the expression.
The pessimist does not lose sight of these attitudes, but is unable to accept the fact that it
is just these attitudes themselves which fill the gap in the optimist's account. (1962,
p.201)
Classical optimists and pessimists both seek external justification, i.e. justification which
overcomes the challenge posed by determinism, for practices that involve holding each other
responsible. For classical optimists, any such practice is justified when, after tally of all the
relevant positive and negative consequences of that practice, it is determined that the benefits for
social cohesion outweigh the costs. For pessimists, holding someone responsible is justified if
that individual satisfies the requirements of agent causation. Appeal to these conditions derives
from the fact that both parties seek justification for our practices from an impossible, or at least
unnecessary, “objective” standpoint, which is external to the practices themselves. Only an
analysis of moral responsibility from this perspective leads to determinism becoming a central
problem, and allows agent causation and the cold calculus of consequentialism to count as
appropriate responses to this problem. Furthermore, the objective stance gets the reasons wrong
for holding others responsible in practice. No one, at the time of offense or benefit, thinks they
are justified in blaming or praising because the object of their attitude has agent causal powers or
because they have calculated all of the relevant consequences.3 Thus, the objective stance
explains the standoff reached in the debate surrounding determinism. Strawson argues in favor of
3

Thanks to Bill Glod for this helpful point.
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an alternative stance by which we can circumvent this standoff and better understand the reasons
for holding responsible.

2.2

The Participant Stance
The alternative proposed by Strawson is to allow another set of “facts as we know them”

– namely, the human attitudes, and especially the “moral sentiments” – to take their rightful
place in a proper understanding of moral responsibility and its associated practices. Strawson
insists on an assumption, which he refers to as “the central commonplace,” that this view rests
upon, namely, “the very great importance that we attach to the attitudes and intentions toward us
of other human beings, and the great extent to which our personal feelings and reactions depend
upon, or involve, our beliefs about these attitudes and intentions” (1962, p. 186). Among the
human attitudes, the reactive attitudes in particular arise in response to the good or ill will of one
person toward another person, which we encounter in ordinary interpersonal interactions. On this
view, reactive attitudes constitute praise or blame and express the interpersonal demands that we
place upon one another – hence the designation expressivism about moral responsibility. These
attitudes are further divided into three sub-types: personal reactive attitudes, vicarious reactive
attitudes, and self-reactive attitudes.
The sub-types of reactive attitudes are differentiated by three classes of objects in
response to which they respectively arise. Personal reactive attitudes arise in response to the
attitude expressed toward oneself by another person, and among these Strawson counts, on the
negative side, resentment, and on the positive side, gratitude. Vicarious reactive attitudes arise in
response to the good or ill will of other people toward still other members of what now emerges
as an interpersonal moral community. Among this second sub-type are included, for example,
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moral disapprobation or indignation and moral approval. Finally, self-reactive attitudes arise
within oneself in response to the quality of one’s own will toward other members of the moral
community; examples include guilt, pride, and the sense of obligation. Defect or excess – and
often mere adequacy – in meeting the demands we place on each other, and on ourselves,
stimulate the reactive attitudes. These attitudes are implicated in responsibility precisely because
disposition to react with these attitudes is constituted by interpersonal demands that we expect
members of the moral community to respect.
Pessimists and classical optimists overlook the reactive attitudes; and, according to
Strawson, reconciliation between these disputants requires recognizing that reactive attitudes are
expressions of the demands we place upon one another. In particular, three consequences of this
recognition can move us toward the reconciliation Strawson seeks. First, reactive attitudes
answer the pessimistic worry that consequentialist justifications of moral responsibility leave out
“something vital,” without the usual, less parsimonious, pessimist appeal to agent causation.
Second, description and analysis of these attitudes provide an adequate theory of responsibility,
so determinism is rendered irrelevant. Third, the external justification for our practices sought by
pessimists and classical optimists becomes unnecessary. Strawson offers separate arguments for
each of these last two claims. Following Russell (1992), I will call these the “rationalistic
argument” and the “naturalistic argument.”
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3. TWO ARGUMENTS FOR STRAWSONIAN MORAL RESPONSIBILTY
Strawson offers two separate arguments in favor of his theory of moral responsibility.
These arguments separately show that a theory of moral responsibility that starts from the
participant stance can fulfill two criteria for a theory of moral responsibility. First, the
rationalistic argument shows that description and analysis of the reactive attitudes can allow one
to reflectively distinguish morally responsible agents from those who are not morally
responsible. This argument is not intended as a justification of Strawson’s theory, but only as
reason to believe that the theory can fulfill the condition that a theory of responsibility can allow
us to distinguish morally responsible agents from those agents who are not morally responsible. I
present my reconstruction of this argument in section 3.1 along with my argument that Strawson
is a cognitivist expressivist about distinguishing responsible from non-responsible agents.
Second, the naturalistic argument shows that external justification for holding responsible is
unnecessary. Rather, Strawson claims that our practices involving holding each other morally
responsible are justifiable from within those practices themselves. I present my reconstruction of
this argument in section 3.2.

3.1

The Rationalistic Argument
First, the rationalistic argument proposes that the truth or falsity of determinism is

irrelevant to an adequate theory of moral responsibility. To establish this point, Strawson offers a
description and analysis of circumstances that are commonly thought to make reactive attitudes
appropriate or render them inappropriate. First, it is necessary to note an important characteristic
of the reactive attitudes. According to Strawson, these attitudes “involve, or express, a certain
sort of demand for inter-personal regard. The fact of injury constitutes a prima-facie appearance
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of this demand's being flouted or unfulfilled” (1962, p. 195). In general, assistance or injury
constitutes an initial appearance of a beneficent or offensive will with respect to some
interpersonal demand. When this happens, a reactive attitude, possibly gratitude or resentment, is
stimulated in response to the good or ill will of the benefactor or offender. Sometimes, though, in
our ordinary interpersonal dealings with one another, we discover some further fact that inhibits
our initial reaction. At this point, in order to anticipate my argument in defense of expressivism,
it is important to emphasize the proposal that reactive attitudes are psychologically prior to
determination of the responsibility of an agent. Only after or concurrent with a reactive attitude
does the question of the responsibility of an agent arise to potentially inhibit that attitude.
Strawson distinguishes two categories of cases in which such inhibition seems appropriate.
Consider a situation in which someone, apparently at random, hits you in the face as you
are walking down the street. You become resentful toward that person, and blame her, maybe
even retaliate against her. Two different situations might inhibit this response. On the one hand,
you might later realize that the injury was an accident, or maybe the person was pushed. In this
case, it is likely that your initial reaction to that particular action becomes inhibited, and you
might even apologize for your misplaced blame. On the other hand, you might later realize that
the person was under exceptional stress or manipulation, or perhaps the person turns out to be
child or a “hopeless schizophrenic” (1962, p. 188-189). In this case, a fact about the person, not
just the particular action, is likely to inhibit your reaction, and render blame or punishment
inappropriate. Following Watson (1987), I will call the first category of exculpatory conditions,
those which relate to actions, cases of excuse and the second category, those which relate to
persons, cases of exemption.
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In the former class of cases, the person remains a participant in the moral community –
one to whom interpersonal demands are addressable and for whom the reactive attitudes are
appropriate. Excuse for some action is appropriate when there is evidence that the actor has no
particularly beneficent or offensive will, when there is no unusual respect for or violation of
some demand. In the latter class of cases, however, the agent does not remain a participant in the
moral community. It is not consideration of the act itself that leads us to exculpate such a person,
but consideration that the agent is not the sort of agent to whom interpersonal demands are
addressable. Such a person is exempt from participation in the moral community either at the
time of injury, in the case of stress or manipulation, or in general, in the case of a child or
psychologically abnormal individual of some sort. Exempt persons may evince beneficence or
offence; but we naturally and appropriately look on cases of exemption with an objective attitude
in much the way pessimists and classical optimists inappropriately look on all human beings with
an objective attitude. Punitive and approbative attitudes or practices are inappropriate for such
agents because they are incapable of recognizing or responding to the demands placed upon
them. For this reason, our demands toward them tend to be inhibited, and we are led to look on
such agents as individuals to be trained or controlled.
Cases of exemption are particularly significant because pessimists effectively hold that if
determinism is true, then all human beings are exempt. However, even without consideration of
determinism, there are clear sets of paradigmatic exemption cases, in which it is judged
appropriate to exculpate an agent for psychological or developmental features that indicate an
abnormal ability to recognize and respond to interpersonal demands. This fact indicates that we
have no reason in practice for allowing determinism to count as an added consideration. The
truth or falsity of determinism does not, and need not, play a role in determining whether an
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agent is morally responsible on this account of moral responsibility, so parsimony dictates that
we leave it aside. Even if we accept the truth of determinism, Strawson points out, it is a selfcontradiction to claim that abnormality is the universal condition (1962, p. 191). Therefore, on
this account of moral responsibility, determinism is a superfluous consideration that is
unnecessary for a theory of moral responsibility. From description and analysis of the reactive
attitudes alone, we can distinguish morally responsible from non-morally responsible agents.
Still, there is an ambiguity in this last statement that must be addressed. On the one hand,
an expressivist might hold that the reactive attitudes provide an adequate theory of responsibility
because they determine when it is appropriate to hold an agent morally responsible, but do not
imply either the truth or falsity of judgments about the responsibility of an agent. According to
this interpretation, expressivism is non-cognitivist about moral responsibility judgments because
it holds that, for all X, the claim “Agent X is morally responsible” is neither true nor false. On
the other hand, an expressivist might hold that the reactive attitudes determine when it is
appropriate to hold an agent morally responsible precisely because these attitudes track the truth
or falsity of judgments about the responsibility of that agent. According to this latter
interpretation, expressivism is cognitivist about moral responsibility because it holds that, for all
X, the claim “Agent X is morally responsible” is true or false. It follows from the non-cognitivist
interpretation of expressivism that any given agent can both count as morally responsible and fail
to count as morally responsible in different contexts without contradiction. Because expressivists
base determinations of responsibility in the reactive attitudes, and propositional formulations of
these judgments may be contradictory, it is impossible for a non-cognitivist expressivist to
reflectively determine whether some agent is morally responsible or not.
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Some interpreters, for example Vargas (2005), refer to Strawson as a “clear case” of noncognitivism about moral responsibility. When we consider that, for Strawson, negative and
positive reactive attitudes respectively constitute blame and praise, it seems as though the noncognitivist interpretation is correct. Reactive attitudes happen quickly and automatically, and no
belief or other form of propositional content is obviously involved. Without propositional
content, it is not clear how a reactive attitude could be construed as true or false, so it is not
obvious how a contradiction among reactive attitudes could arise. However, the story Strawson
presents to explain how the reactive attitudes can provide an adequate theory of responsibility
does not end with the reactive attitutdes. He goes on to describe the conditions under which we
inhibit these attitudes, and judge it appropriate to do so. This part of the story, which describes
conditions for exculpation, provides the theory that allows us to reflectively determine when an
agent is responsible and when not. For this reason, exculpation conditions are essential for an
adequate expressivist theory of responsibility. Furthermore, the varieties of exculpation, both
excuse and exemption, entail a judgment about an action or an agent that does have propositional
content. For example, “Agent X was pushed” or “Agent X is a child” are both reflections that are
either true or false. Therefore, while Strawson may be a non-cognitivist about the initial reactive
attitudes, he is a cognitivist about moral responsibility. This point will become particularly
important as we consider the objections to Strawsonian expressivism in section 4.
The rationalistic argument proposes that description and analysis of the reactive attitudes
toward some agent are sufficient for determining whether or not that agent is morally
responsible. There is no reason to believe that this view is a non-cognitivist one, and good reason
to believe that we should interpret it as a cognitivist position about moral responsibility
judgments. In the next section, I turn to the reasons Strawson offers for believing that this view is
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justified, even without the external justification sought by optimists and pessimists about
responsibility.

3.2

The Naturalistic Argument
The second argument Strawson presents in favor of his theory, the naturalistic argument,

proposes that inclusion of the human attitudes in a theory of responsibility renders the kind of
justification for our practices sought by pessimists and classical optimists unnecessary. Although
the rationalistic argument shows that consideration of determinism is not required for an
adequate theory of responsibility, a pessimist or classical optimist might respond that this
argument does not show our practices or attitudes are justified. The rationalistic argument does
not by itself defend against the threat determinism poses to our punitive and approbative
practices and attitudes. However, pessimists and classical optimists alike assume that
justification of our punitive and approbative practices requires that we have some reason outside
of our everyday practices for ignoring determinism (for example, because there is reason to
believe that determinism is false or because our practices are useful for regulating behavior even
if determinism is true). Thus, on their view, justification of our practices requires us to explain
why determinism does not exempt all human beings, thereby forcing us always to take the
objective stance toward everyone.
In response, Strawson points out that even if the truth of determinism should, from the
objective standpoint, exempt all human beings from moral responsibility, it is impossible in
practice for us to universally exempt each other in this way. Participation in normal interpersonal
relationships is part of our nature, and “[such participation] precisely is being exposed to the
range of reactive attitudes and feelings that is in question” (1962, p. 192). In turn, being an
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appropriate object of the reactive attitudes implies moral responsibility. Therefore, we are
committed, not just to ordinary interpersonal relationships, but also to the human attitudes that
constitute holding each other responsible. It is impossible, in practice, to universally give up
these attitudes even if a theoretical consideration such as determinism suggests that we should.
Of course, we can sometimes abstain from the participant stance, withdrawing from the human
attitudes, in favor of an objective standpoint. The objective stance is useful, even with respect to
normal adults who are capable of recognizing interpersonal demands, “as a refuge, say, from the
strains of involvement; or as an aid to policy; or simply out of intellectual curiosity” (1962, p.
190). Still, Strawson claims, it is not possible to completely withdraw from the human attitudes.
The expression of human nature at least partially requires exposing oneself to the human
attitudes in the participant stance. Universally taking the objective stance would mean giving up
our very humanity. In a footnote, Strawson draws a useful comparison with Hume’s justification
of induction:
Compare the question of the justification of induction. The human commitment to
inductive belief-formation is original, natural, non-rational (not irrational), in no way
something we choose or could give up. Yet rational criticism and reflection can refine
standards and their application, supply ‘rules for judging of cause and effect'. Ever since
the facts were made clear by Hume, people have been resisting acceptance of them (1962,
p. 204).
The analogy between reactive attitudes and perceptual experience is apt given that both are
automatic and natural, yet open to misplaced dismissal.
The fact that our human nature commits us to the reactive attitudes indicates that the
pessimists and classical optimists are wrong to seek external justification for our practices, or the
attitudes on which they are founded, by considering the human condition only or originally from
an objective standpoint. These philosophers, like politicians or bureaucrats, take the objective
stance “as an aid to policy.” However, rather than starting with an understanding of interpersonal
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human involvement and using the objective stance only as an aid, pessimists and classical
optimists go wrong by starting with concern for the effect determinism should have on punitive
and approbative practices and forgetting the human attitudes entirely. To these disputants,
determinism seems pressing since they have only a partial view of the facts in mind – namely,
our punitive and approbative practices, and not the attitudes on which these practices are
founded. Yet, rather than turn to an internal analysis of the human attitudes, pessimists and
classical optimists “over-intellectualize,” seeking external justification for our practices and
attitudes from the objective standpoint.
The reactive attitudes can alleviate concern with determinism both because they are
adequate for distinguishing responsible people from those who are not and because they are
inescapable for human beings qua human beings. The rationalistic argument shows that we can
distinguish morally responsible agents from cases of excuse and exemption by describing and
analyzing when and how reactive attitudes arise in response to actions and agents within the
participant stance. The naturalistic argument shows that, regardless of what we conclude in the
objective stance, we are not able to give up all instances of our reactive attitudes in order to view
others and ourselves from a purely disinterested standpoint. Therefore, the demand for external
justification for our punitive and approbative practices and attitudes asks too much of a theory of
moral responsibility. The point of these arguments is to show that reconciliation in the debate
surrounding determinism can and should come by reminding the interlocutors about the reactive
attitudes, and further suggesting that they take the participant stance as a starting point for
constructing a theory of responsibility. Since consideration of determinism, and objective
standpoint considerations generally, are both superfluous for a theory of responsibility
(according to the rationalistic argument) and inefficacious in undermining the fact that we hold
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each other responsible (according to the naturalistic argument), we should leave them aside. At
this point, there is no further basis for the disagreement between pessimists and classical
optimists. Still, there are important criticisms of Strawson’s view in the contemporary literature.
Given my reconstruction of Strawson’s two arguments for, and my cognitivist interpretation of,
his position, I hope to dispel two of these contemporary criticisms in the remainder of this essay.
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4. LUCK AND REVISION
While Strawsonian expressivism is widely influential among contemporary theorists of
moral responsibility, many important objections have been raised. Here, I consider and respond
to two representative examples: one metaphysical objection and one epistemological objection.
First, a more concise presentation of Strawson’s main argument for expressivism:
1. Description and internal analysis of the human attitudes can provide an
epistemologically adequate theory of responsibility (Rationalistic Premise).
2. Natural commitment to the human attitudes renders external justification of these
attitudes unnecessary (Naturalistic Premise).
Therefore,
3. Moral responsibility may be understood and justified using description and internal
analysis of the human attitudes alone.
1 and 2 are, respectively, the conclusions of the rationalistic and naturalistic arguments. They are
also the premises of the main argument for expressivism, so I will refer to them as premises from
this point on. Note that premise 1 and 2 depend on each other. Without premise 1, even natural
commitment to punitive and approbative practices and attitudes might not allow us to determine
who is responsible and who is not. Without premise 2, the practices and attitudes that allow us to
distinguish responsible agents from agents who qualify for excuse and exemption might not be
justified. The epistemological objection argues that premise 1 is false because consideration of
the possibility of moral luck shows that we cannot use description and analysis of the reactive
attitudes to adequately distinguish morally responsible from exempt agents. The metaphysical
objection argues that premises 1 and 2 are in conflict with one another, and accepting the
revisability of our initial reactive attitudes shows that we should give up premise 2.
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4.1

Moral Luck
The first objection is raised against the rationalistic premise by Watson (1987). Strawson

intends this first premise to imply that the truth or falsity of determinism is irrelevant to an
adequate theory of responsibility. In fact, I will construe this premise more broadly to imply that
no objective standpoint criteria – those which are fixed independent of description and analysis
of the reactive attitudes – are required to formulate a theory of responsibility that allows us to
reflectively determine which agents are responsible and which are not.4 A Strawsonian must be
able to show that we can have an adequate theory of responsibility without appeal to some
external criteria, such as agent causation or consequentialism. To avoid being external in the
relevant sense, the criteria that allow us to reflectively distinguish responsible from nonresponsible agents must be formulated as hypothesis based on the evidence provided by the
reactive attitudes for the purpose of testing them against reactive attitudes which arise in further
cases. To point us in the right direction, Strawson offers some paradigmatic cases of excuse and
exemption, and a description of how a child or psychoanalytic patient emerges from exemption
into full responsibility. He also suggests that, in the case of excuse, empirical evidence pertaining
to the intention of an agent, or, in the case of exemption, the cognitive capacities of an agent, are
what causes inhibition of reactive attitudes toward that agent. Although there are paradigmatic
cases which fit these criteria and seem to track our reactive attitudes, expressivism remains open
to incorporating other criteria if counter-examples show our reactive attitudes do not always
track intention or cognitive capacity. However, if it turns out that reactive attitudes sometimes
conflict with respect to some agent in a way that is not amenable to a coherent set of criteria,
then as a cognitivist I accept that expressivism fails to formulate an epistemologically adequate
4

Other examples of objective standpoint criteria might include the falsity of fatalism or of God’s foreknowledge.
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theory of responsibility based on reactive attitudes in the participant stance. If expressivism does
fail to allow us to distinguish morally responsible from non-morally responsible agents, premise
1 of the main argument is unacceptable.
Watson (1987) cites a case that he believes undermines formulation of a coherent
expressivist interpretation of Strawson’s theory by prompting conflicting reactive attitudes
toward the same agent, therefore leaving it indeterminate whether or not that agent is morally
responsible according to expressivism. To begin, he notes, “reactive attitudes are sensitive not
only to the quality of others’ wills, but depend on a background of beliefs about the objects of
those attitudes” (1987, p. 121). In cases of excuse, a belief about how an action came about
defeats any reason to believe the will of the actor runs contrary to the demands which that actor
is expected to respect. In contrast, exemption takes place when reactive attitudes are inhibited by
beliefs that imply an agent does not have the capacity to be addressed as a member of the moral
community. The problem is that those who are incapacitated in this way can sometimes show
good or ill will towards others, thereby stimulating reactive attitudes. Since, according to
expressivism, reactive attitudes are supposed to determine when an agent is or is not responsible,
it is difficult to see how we can reflectively recognize when an agent is exempt. Pessimists or
classical optimists can avoid this problem by arguing that their theoretical criteria, external to the
reactive attitudes, determine when an agent is properly considered exempt or responsible. This
response is not available to the Strawsonian because appropriateness for the reactive attitudes
constitutes moral responsibility, and appropriateness can only be determined by analyzing when
the reactive attitudes are stimulated or inhibited. If the beliefs that inhibit reactive attitudes in the
paradigmatic cases of exemption imply objective standpoint criteria for moral responsibility,
then exemption cases undermine expressivism. Watson initially avoids this problem for two
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cases of exemption, children and agents “under great strain,” by showing that exemption in these
cases depends only on how the reactive attitudes are modified. He then argues that one case of
exemption, “being unfortunate in formative circumstances,” is inimical to expressivism because
it is impossible to know who fits this description without appeal to independent criteria for moral
responsibility.
First, consider how Watson shows that exempting children is amenable to expressivism.
Children are members of Strawson’s second sub-type of exemption cases, which exempt agents
in general rather than just at the time of injury. The fact that children lack the cognitive capacity
and moral competence required to understand and respond to the demands placed upon them
explains their exempt status. Furthermore, children only gradually become members of the moral
community because they only gradually develop the required capacities and competence –
possibly recognizing different demands at different points in time on an individual basis. Since
good will with respect to some demand requires recognition of and ability to respond to that
demand, expressivism can accommodate the fact that reactive attitudes become inhibited in
response to a belief that children often lack such recognition and only gradually develop it.
Second, consider how Watson shows that exempting agents due to their “being under
great strain” is amenable to expressivism. Such agents fall under Strawson’s first sub-type of
exemption cases, which exempt agents only at the time of injury. In these cases, the agent in
question is generally able to recognize and respond to demands; so, unlike the case of children,
these cases cannot be explained by lack of these capacities. Rather, the fact that agents under
great strain often act uncharacteristically explains their exemption. Demand for good will is
limited to normal circumstances, and provides for exception under unusual circumstances. For
apparent good will with respect to some demand to count as beneficence, reflective endorsement
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of that will is required. Expressivism can accommodate the fact that reactive attitudes become
inhibited in response to a belief that someone is not expressing their “true self” because this
condition coheres with the general requirement that responsible agents are capable of
recognizing and responding to interpersonal demands.
For expressivism, no contradiction arises among the principles required to explain the
exemption of children and people under great stress; so it is not necessary to appeal to agent
causation, social regulation, or any other external theoretical requirement. Again, the principles
hypothetically formulated to exclude children and persons under great stress from responsibility
are not formed independent of the reactive attitudes, and are therefore internal to the attitudes
and practices involved in holding responsible. These principles are intended to track the reactive
attitudes and they may be tested against intuitions about other cases. However, Watson returns to
another exemption case of the second sub-class, which he does think requires external criteria in
order to coherently exclude from moral responsibility: those who were “unfortunate in formative
circumstances.” Watson quotes at length a description of the life of Robert Harris as a case study
of this type of exemption. In brief, Harris egregiously murdered two boys in the course of a 1978
bank robbery, laughed about the crime, and expressed interest in killing police who would later
arrive at the scene. Indignation toward Harris was magnified by his casual disdain for even basic
social norms and contempt for human life. By all accounts, Watson claims, Harris was the
epitome of evil, “an ‘archetypal candidate’ for blame” (1987, p. 128).
After arriving at this conclusion, Watson considers how our reactive attitudes are affected
by the developments that lead someone like Harris to become evil. It turns out that Harris had a
particularly brutal childhood. His mother admits she feels guilty that she was never able to love
him; she blamed Robert for her problems with her husband; he would plead for affection and get
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tossed aside; both his parents physically abused him; and as a teenager he was raped several
times. His sister is quoted in the Los Angeles Times article that Watson excerpts for his
description:
[Barbara Harris] put her head in her hands and cried softly. ‘One killer out of nine
kids…The sad thing is he was the most sensitive of all of us. When he was 10 and we all
saw ‘Bambi’, he cried and cried when Bambi’s mother was shot. Everything was pretty to
him as a child; he loved animals. But all that changed; it all changed so much.” (1987, p.
129)
It seems our indignation for Robert Harris the man is modified by the belief that Robert Harris
the boy was “unfortunate in formative circumstances.”
In the case of a child, inhibition of reactive attitudes is explained by knowledge that
children have underdeveloped cognitive capacities and lack of moral competence. In the case of
people experiencing abnormal stress, evidence that they are incapable of normally responding to
interpersonal demands explains why reactive attitudes are inhibited. Initially, one might think
there is some fact about the way Harris was as an adult that exempts him, just as there are nonhistorical exempting facts about children and people under stress, so that it is not necessary to
appeal to the historical conditions that made Harris into the kind of man he became. For
example, Harris apparently does not respond to moral demands at all, and his outright rejection
of the moral community might mean moral demands are not addressable to him in the way
required for moral responsibility. The problem with this explanation is that our reactive attitudes
are not inhibited by the fact that he is not morally addressable at the time of his crimes, nor do
they respond to any other structural or situational facts about Harris. If we exempt Harris for his
outright rejection of the moral community, then modification of reactive attitudes cannot be the
ground for this exemption; the ground must instead be some independent theoretical conviction.
Of course, this approach is not amenable to expressivism. Moreover, if we exempt Harris for his
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radical rejection of moral demand, then all radically evil agents must also be exempt from
responsibility simply because of the extremity of their rejection. Without a sympathetic historical
background, this fails to conform to our normal reactive attitudes. The more obvious
consideration, which does inhibit our attitudes toward Harris, is the abusive history leading up to
rejection of the moral community.
Although knowledge of an abusive childhood modifies our reactive attitudes toward an
evil person, according to Watson this consideration also implies an independent theoretical
conviction, which is unacceptable for expressivism. First, note that Harris does not meet the
expressivist conditions for excuse: his history does not undermine the thought that he acted
maliciously. Second, although it is not obvious whether Harris meets exemption conditions, if we
accept that he was incapacitated for membership in the moral community by his unfortunate
childhood, then, once again, Watson argues there is reason to exempt all radically evil agents
simply for being radically evil (1987, p. 133). To see why, consider a radically evil agent for
whom there is no apparent historical explanation, someone who is inexplicably vicious. Watson
calls such individuals “bad apples.” Even when there is no obvious abuse or other social
explanation for the viciousness of a bad apple, Watson suggests that we should suppose there is
something that makes bad apples incapable of recognizing and responding to moral demands, for
example, something “in their genes or brain.” Supposing there is such an explanation for every
radically evil individual, this explanation should play the same role in exempting the individual
that abuse plays in exempting Harris. With respect to Harris, our reactive attitudes fluctuate
between antipathy and sympathy. Therefore, our reactive attitudes toward all radically evil
agents also should be ambivalent, leaving it indeterminate whether such agents are morally
responsible or not on the expressivist theory.
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This argument presents one part of the epistemological problem that historical
considerations pose for expressivism. Since ambivalent reactive attitudes make it indeterminate
whether radically evil agents are morally responsible or not, the reactive attitudes are not
amenable to the formulation of a coherent set of principles for deciding whether radically evil
agents are responsible. However, Watson extends this problem again from radically evil agents
to all agents, evil or not. Just as we are largely ignorant of the historical considerations that likely
make radically evil agents the way they are, we are largely ignorant of the historical
considerations that make anyone, including ourselves, the way we are. When we turn the
sympathy we feel for Harris as we consider his history toward other people, or inward toward
ourselves, we recognize that the difference between “us good people” and “those evil people” is
just a matter of moral luck. In this way, reactive attitudes toward all people are made ambivalent
by ignorance of the historical factors that determine what kind of person one becomes. This
ignorance, Watson supposes, should make us skeptical of the reactive attitudes generally (1987,
p. 137). Furthermore, for an expressivist, general skepticism of the reactive attitudes is not
separable from skepticism about responsibility. The point of formulating a reflective theory of
responsibility is that such a theory will allow us to correct our reactive attitudes where an error
arises here or there; but if all our reactive attitudes are suspect, then there is no expressivist basis
on which to formulate such a theory. If Watson is correct to generalize skepticism about reactive
attitudes, then we must give up premise 1 of the main argument.
In response to Watson, I raise three objections. First, the Harris case does not exemplify a
pernicious ambivalence in our reactive attitudes. Although we are variously antipathetic and
sympathetic toward Harris, this opposition in our attitudes is not the one Strawson claims
constitutes the opposition between blame and praise. It would be problematic for expressivism if
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we experienced both indignation and approbation with respect to Harris, or some similar
sentiments, since these are the relevant contradictory reactive attitudes. It would also be
problematic for expressivism if our reactive attitudes toward Harris indicated that we both blame
him and exempt him. Our sympathy with Harris, however, does not contradict our indignation.
According to the cognitivist interpretation of Strawsonian expressivism I offered, a belief that
contradicts the belief that an agent is able to understand and respond to demands would inhibit
reactive attitudes, but mixed feeling about an agent does not result in exemption. Since there is
no contradiction in “sympathetic blame,” expressivism of the cognitivist sort that I attributed to
Strawson has no problem accounting for the ambivalence we feel as we learn about the past that
made Harris malicious. While McKenna (1998, p. 206) accepts that Harris is not a member of
the moral community in the course of his response to Watson, I see no reason to concede this
point. Consider how you would respond to Harris if you met him in a dark alleyway. If you
would not immediately run away, I suspect you would at least be on your guard in his presence.
This does not change even when you know of his childhood. Such ostracization shows that
negative reactive attitudes are not dispelled. It is important to remember that expressivism is a
theory of social moral responsibility, not of legal responsibility. I noted earlier (see n.2) that even
for an expressivist, legal punitive and approbative practices may require justification that goes
beyond that required for our everyday attitudes and practices. It may be true that knowledge of
an abusive childhood would change how the legal system should deal with a criminal – maybe
we should treat rather than punish such a person – but such knowledge does not change our
interpersonal attitudes and practices in the participant stance. Therefore, there is no reason to
suppose that ambivalence with respect to Harris makes it impossible to formulate an adequate
expressivist theory of responsibility.
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Second, at this point the analogy between Harris and bad apples also breaks down. Since
Harris is not exempt because of his abusive history, neither are bad apples exempt for some
hypothetical malfunction in their genes or brain. It is instructive to note that, even if Harris were
exempt, there is an important dissimilarly between cases like Harris and bad apples. Namely,
Harris is a victim of his abusers, but it is impossible to be a victim of one’s genes or brain in a
sense which calls for reactive attitudes. Victimhood in this sense implies that someone has
violated a demand that the victim legitimately places on others. The reason we sympathize with
Harris to some degree is that the interpersonal violations he was subject to call for some punitive
attitudes and practices. However, neither genes, nor brains, nor any other non-person is
addressable with interpersonal demands, so it is wrong to characterize bad apples as victims. Of
course, bad apples may be incapacitated in some way, for example, by a brain tumor; but then
there is an explanation for the apparent viciousness, so such incapacity is epistemologically
different from someone who is under hypnosis or high stress, or a psychologically deranged
individual. In all of these cases it might take some investigation before evidence presents itself
which leads you to inhibit your reactive attitudes, but there is no reason to inhibit reactive
attitudes independent of such evidence. Even if one does not accept my argument that Harris is
not exempt, the analogy between Harris and bad apples is flawed because bad apples are not
victims like Harris. Therefore, there is no reason to think inexplicably vicious individuals are
exempt, and they do not pose a problem for expressivism.
Third, the analogy Watson draws between bad apples and all people is also flawed. Even
if you still think that Harris is exempt and the analogy with bad apples holds, these propositions
do not imply that we should generalize skepticism about responsibility for all people based on
historical considerations. Watson points to the problem of moral luck in order to impress the idea
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that skepticism of negative reactive attitudes with respect to bad apples should generalize in this
way (1987, p. 137). None of us creates our character out of nothing, so, Watson claims, it is a
matter of luck whether we turn out virtuous or vicious. Since, for most people, and even for
ourselves, we lack knowledge of the past that determines character, Watson argues that we, in
general, should be skeptical of, and therefore inhibit, the reactive attitudes. However, lack of
evidence for self-creation is not evidence of incapacity. Just like in the case of bad apples, there
is no reason to exempt anyone without appropriate exculpatory evidence available. There is also
a further dissimilarity between inexplicably evil persons and other members of the moral
community that did not exist between Harris and bad apples. Normal people are different from
bad apples because normal people show good or ill will variously in the course of their lives or
even in the course of a day. Evidence that distinguishes good will from ill will, and persons who
are capable of displaying these intentional states from persons who are not so capable, is all that
is necessary to formulate a theory that distinguishes morally responsible individuals from
excused or exempted ones. Even if it is true that luck plays a large role in how we become who
we are, an adequate expressivist theory of responsibility is still possible. Justification for basing
such a theory on the reactive attitudes is another matter, which I consider in section 4.2.
Although Strawson himself responds to the threat of determinism by noting that it is
irrelevant to the formulation of an adequate theory of responsibility, it is possible for some other
consideration to threaten general skepticism about the reactive attitudes. General skepticism
about the reactive attitudes would undermine the ability to formulate a theory of responsibility
based on those attitudes, and would have to lead to skepticism about moral responsibility.
Watson attempts to engender this skepticism by showing that historical considerations,
particularly the idea that luck plays a large role in who we become, should lead to skepticism
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about the reactive attitudes. In response, I argue that (a) understanding the history of Harris does
not exempt him; (b) even if his history did exempt him, failure to understand the evil of bad
apples does not show that we should exempt them; and (c) even if we should exempt bad apples,
the fact that normal people are not pervasively evil like bad apples is a relevant difference, which
shows that we need not accept general skepticism of the reactive attitudes. Thus, Watson does
not show that we should give up premise 1 of the main argument for expressivism.
Strawson’s claim that the reactive attitudes are an adequate basis for distinguishing
responsible and non-responsible agents is left untouched by the Harris case, bad apples, or moral
luck. However, if we interpreted Strawson as a non-cognitivist about moral responsibility
judgments, then the tension between our antipathetic and sympathetic response to Harris at
various points would be enough to undermine our ability to reflectively determine whether or not
Harris is responsible. In contrast, according the cognitivist interpretation of Strawson, sympathy
(or any other positive emotion) toward some agent is not enough to exculpate. Rather,
exculpation is specifically an inhibition of the original reactive attitude by a belief about the
exculpated individual that contradicts the presumed capacity for understanding and responding to
moral demands. The Harris cased does not exemplify any such contradiction, and neither do bad
apples nor lucky persons display any such incapacity. Still, one point Watson raises remains
unopposed. At the end of his article, Watson claims that premise 2 – the claim that we need not
appeal to external justification – is also false. He notes that Albert Einstein might be a good
example of someone who gave up the reactive attitudes all together, so it might not be true that
we are committed to these attitudes, as Strawson claims. The argument against premise 2 is more
fully fleshed out by Paul Russell, and it is this argument that I will turn to next.
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4.2

Reactive Attitude Revision
The second objection to expressivism is raised by Russell (1992), who argues that we

should give up premise 2 of the main argument for expressivism. To begin, Russell claims that
Strawson either misses the point of the pessimistic position or a conflict arises between the
rationalistic and naturalistic premises, which renders the argument incoherent. In either case, it
turns out there is still reason to doubt the metaphysical claim that some morally responsible
agents exist and, consequently, to ask for justification for our practices and attitudes from the
objective stance. According to this argument, Strawson equivocates on the definition of
naturalism with respect to the reactive attitudes.5 On the one hand, naturalism about reactive
attitudes might mean that persons are committed to these attitudes at the type level; on the other
hand, naturalism might mean that persons are committed to these attitudes at the token level.
Type-level naturalism holds that human beings are necessarily disposed to experience the
reactive attitudes. Russell acknowledges that, interpreted as a type naturalist, Strawson is correct
to point out that we are committed to the reactive attitudes in interpersonal relations. However,
pessimists need not be skeptical about dispositional commitment to such attitudes. Rather,
pessimists only need to claim that for any token reactive attitude that arises, it is possible to
inhibit that attitude. This latter position contrasts with token-level naturalism, which holds that
persons are committed to at least some instances of the reactive attitudes that in fact arise. Unlike
token-level naturalism, type-level naturalism does not imply commitment to any particular
reactive attitude that might arise, so type-level naturalism is compatible with pessimism. Since
Strawson intends for his argument to undermine pessimism, it is more charitable to read him as a
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token-level naturalist. However, Russell argues, token-level naturalism is inconsistent with the
rationalistic argument.
Recall that the rationalistic argument depends on recognition of our ability to excuse or
exempt some agents in light of further facts and subsequently revise reactive attitudes toward
them. Since Strawson argues that any particular instance of the reactive attitudes can be inhibited
by further facts, it seems problematic for him also to hold that we are naturally committed to any
token reactive attitudes that arise. Remember, both Strawson and the pessimists agree that
incapacity of some sort makes an agent inappropriate for the punitive and approbative practices
and attitudes. The pessimist further claims that determinism generates one such incapacity for
every agent, so all particular instances of reactive attitudes should be inhibited.6 Thus, Strawson
must either miss the point of the pessimistic worry (as a type naturalist) or contradict the
rationalistic argument by holding that at least some instances of the reactive attitudes are
unrevisable (as a token naturalist). In either case, the result is that pessimists and classical
optimists are right to think our punitive and approbative practices are not internally justifiable,
instead requiring justification from the objective standpoint. Thus, it seems that premise 2 of the
main argument is undermined by an implication of premise 1, that reactive attitudes are revisable
in light of further facts.
While I think Strawson commits himself to both kinds of naturalism, this objection fails
because, according to the cognitivist interpretation of expressivism, token naturalism is not
actually inconsistent with the rationalistic argument. Strawson is committed to both of the
following claims:
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incorporates all such considerations.
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1. All token reactive attitudes have the potential to be revised in the face of further facts
(from premise 1 of the main argument).
2. Some token reactive attitudes are actually inescapable (from premise 2 of the main
argument).
These claims are not contradictory because the reactive attitudes that are in fact modified by
further facts are not the same reactive attitudes as the ones that are inescapable. The further facts
which actually (and ought to) excuse an action are facts that undermine the belief that the action
was done with a beneficent or malicious intent. The further facts which actually (and ought to)
make an agent exempt are facts that make that agent incapable of recognizing or acting on
interpersonal demands. Again it is important to remember that, according to cognitivist
expressivism, the truth-maker for the claim that some action is excusable or that some agent is
exemptible is a fact about the action or the agent, not simply a change in valance of the reactive
response toward the agent. Although any reactive attitude is potentially modifiable upon
recognition of these exculpatory conditions, not all actions or agents fit the conditions for excuse
or exemption. There is no contradiction between claims 1 and 2 unless we antecedently assume
that all token reactive attitudes not only have the potential for revision, but also should in fact be
revised.
Furthermore, premise 1 of the main argument alone implies that there is no reason to
commit to this antecedent assumption. According to premise 1, which Russell provisionally
accepts, there are two possible reasons for universal exculpation: universal excuse for actions
and universal exemption for persons. It is obvious that some actions are done with intent to help
or harm and some are not, so there cannot be universal excuse. It is less obvious whether or not
there is reason to universally exempt. To emphasize that universal exemption is possible, Russell
stresses the point that Strawson waivers between calling exempted agents “incapacitated” and
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calling them “abnormal” (1992, p. 153). Strawson rightly notes that any thesis which holds
‘abnormality is a universal condition’ is self-contradictory (1992, p. 191). Yet, Russell points
out, it is not self-contradictory for incapacity to be the universal condition. What Russell fails to
recognize is that, in the participant stance, incapacity just means failure to function normally
with respect to recognition and response to interpersonal demands. Any incapacity that applies
universally would make it impossible to distinguish in practice those agents who are responsible
and those who are not. Therefore, by accepting premise 1 (as I have argued we should), Russell
blocks his own criticism because premise 1 implies that universal exemption is impossible.
Since, if true, determinism applies to everyone equally, it cannot have any bearing on what
constitutes incapacity in the sense operative for Strawson. Participation in interpersonal
relationships necessarily involves placing demands on each other, so according to expressivism
some morally responsible agents must exist. The fact that token instances of the reactive attitudes
are modifiable by rational considerations does not, by itself, imply that we should inhibit all
instances of these attitudes.
Again, Russell argues that the rationalistic and naturalistic premises conflict and, since
the reactive attitudes are revisable, as the rationalistic premise suggests, a Strawsonian
expressivist should give up the naturalistic premise, asserting that justification requires rejection
of determinism and other potential universal exemptions from the objective standpoint. In
response, I argue that Russell begs the question. The reason he offers to believe we are not
committed to any token reactive attitudes is that all token reactive attitudes are revisable; but the
only reason to believe all token reactive attitudes are revisable is that we are not committed to
any of them. Moreover, I argue, we are committed to precisely the reactive attitudes for which
there is no contravening evidence. Since the operative notion of incapacity in the participant
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stance does not allow for universal exemption, it is not possible to give up all token instances of
the reactive attitudes. Taken together, these points refute the objection Russell offers.
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5. CONCLUSION
The main argument Strawson gives for expressivism rests on two claims. First, he claims
we can know who is responsible and who is not by description and analysis of the reactive
attitudes. Second, he claims that participation in social interaction commits us to reactive
attitudes that arise in response to the good or ill will of those who can recognize and respond to
the demands of the moral community. After reconstruction the two arguments Strawson offers
for these claims, I have attempted to defend each against two common objections.
The moral luck objection argues that it is impossible to formulate a theory based on the
reactive attitudes that epistemologically allows us to determine which agents are the morally
responsible ones. Sometimes people argue that objective standpoint considerations such as
determinism, fatalism, or God’s foreknowledge might undermine moral responsibility. Strawson
attempts to avoid such considerations by showing that we can have an adequate theory of
responsibility by analyzing and forming principles based on the reactive attitudes which arise in
the participant stance. The criticism offered by Watson is interesting because he attempts to
show that we cannot formulate a theory by analysis of the reactive attitudes alone. I argue that
Watson fails to show this both because ambivalent sentiments toward Harris are not inconsistent
with cognitivist expressivism and because the analogies that Watson proposes to lead us toward
radical skepticism about moral responsibility in the participant stance fail.
The revisionist objection argues that we are not justified in formulating a theory of
responsibility based in the reactive attitudes alone because we are not committed to the reactive
attitudes in the way suggested by Strawson. Russell argues that the rationalistic premise shows
that we are not committed to token reactive attitudes, as implied by the naturalistic premise, and
we are therefore not committed to the existence of some morally responsible agents. This
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argument implies that justification for belief in morally responsible agents must come from
principles based not in the reactive attitudes, but in principles formulated from the objective
stance, independent of the reactive attitudes. In response, I argue that we are in fact committed to
some token reactive attitudes, namely, those for which we have no exculpatory evidence.
According to the cognitivist interpretation of expressivism, exculpation requires a belief that an
agent is incapacitated for moral address. Therefore, absent such a belief, no revision is required.
The fact that there are cases in which no such belief arises is, as Strawson suggests, all the
justification necessary for the claim that our punitive and approbative attitudes and practices
establish the existence of some morally responsible agents.
The rationalistic premise establishes that it is possible to formulate a theory of moral
responsibility based on the reactive attitudes. The naturalistic premise establishes that we are
justified in formulating such a theory without rejecting all of the possible factors that seem to
universally exculpate agents from the objective stance. Thus, the premises of the main argument
for expressivism depend on each other by establishing two points necessary for an expressivist
theory of moral responsibility: (a) it is possible to formulate principles based on the reactive
attitudes and, (b) the reactive attitudes are a justified basis for the principles. The process of
formulating an expressivist theory of responsibility may thus proceed by hypothesizing
principles of moral responsibility based in the reactive attitudes that are evident in some cases,
and testing these principles against the reactive attitudes which arise in other cases.
Strawson and Watson, along with many others who sympathize with expressivism, use
this method, which is often referred to as reflective equilibrium, by appealing to their own
intuitions and anecdotal examples of reactive attitudes observed in others. Yet, it should be clear
that the input for an expressivist reflective equilibrium is not just the reactive attitudes of a few
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academics, but the reactive attitudes of the folk in general. The most important implication of
expressivism is that it suggests a conservative approach to the everyday practices and attitudes of
normal people in everyday interpersonal situations. This may sound troubling at first, since
common sense intuitions and practices may seem inconsistent and insensitive. However, this
pretense should be resisted prior to empirical investigation of folk practices and reactive
attitudes, especially if Strawson is right about the errors generated by objective stance theorizing
about moral responsibility. Even if common practices and attitudes are not perfectly consistent,
expressivism allows for some revision along Strawsonian lines (Vargas, 2004). Before taking
this step, however, it is important to have an accurate empirical description of common practices
and attitudes in hand for analysis. Fortunately, there is a growing body of evidence about folk
intuitions and judgments about responsibility to draw from. Further research should take this
evidence into account, including both the possibility that ambivalent reactive attitudes might
challenge the expressivist theory and the possibility that inconsistent reactive attitudes might
require revision.
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